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Union membership displayed a ￿∩-shaped pattern over the 20th century, while the distribution of income
sketched a ￿^. A model of unions is developed to analyze these phenomena. There is a distribution of
firms in the economy. Firms hire capital, plus skilled and unskilled labor. Unionization is a costly
process. A union decides how many firms to organize and its members' wage rate. Simulation of the
developed model establishes that skilled-biased technological change, which affects the productivity
of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor, can potentially explain the above facts. Statistical analysis
suggests that skill-biased technological change is an important factor in de-unionization.
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In 1900 seven percent of the American workforce were union members. The number of union
members rose until the middle of the century, as shown in Figure 1, hitting its apex at 32%.
It then began a slow decline. At the end of century 14% of American workers belonged to a
union. At the beginning of the 20th century, the top 10% of workers earned 41% of income.
This ﬁgure declined hitting a low of 31% around mid-century. It then steadily increased to
41% around 2000.1 What could have caused the ∩- s h a p e dp a t t e r no fu n i o nm e m b e r s h i p
and the ∪-shaped one for the distribution of income? Are they related?
The hypothesis here is that skill-biased technological change underlies the rise and fall
in union membership, along with the up and down in income inequality. The beginning
of the 20th century witnessed a shift away from an artisan economy toward an assembly
line one. This favored unskilled labor. The premium for skill declined. Unskilled labor is
homogenous, almost by deﬁnition. This makes it easier to unionize than skilled labor. When
the demand for unskilled labor rises there is a larger payoﬀ to unionizing it. Things changed
at the midpoint of the century. The second industrial revolution was petering out and the
information age was dawning. Transistors and silicon chips meant that automatons could
replace the hoards of unskilled workers laboring on factory and oﬃce ﬂoors. This represented
a reversal of the earlier trend.
A general equilibrium model of unionization is developed. The union makes two inter-
connected decisions. First, it picks a common wage rate for its members. Second, the union
selects which ﬁrms in the economy to organize. Unionization is a costly process. Firms sell
output in a competitive market. They hire both skilled and unskilled labor. These inputs
1 The income inequality measure is before individual income taxes—see the data appendix for more detail.
Therefore changes in the progressivity of income taxation do not account for the ∪-shaped pattern in income
inequality. The rise in inequality since the 1970s is well documented and holds for a wide variety of inequality
measures—see Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) for an early documentation of this trend for many measures
of wage inequality. Interestingly, Goldin and Katz (2008, Figure 8.1, p. 290) report a ∪-shaped pattern for
the college-graduate wage premium for the period of study here. Somewhat surprisingly, they also show that
during the ﬁrst part of the twentieth century the high-school graduate wage premium actually fell; i.e., the
return to a less-than-high-school education rose. These facts ﬁt well into the framework laid out here.








































Figure 1: Union membership and the distribution of income over the 20th century—a discus-
sion of the data sources used in this ﬁgure is contained in the Appendix
2are substitutable to some extent. When the productivity of unskilled labor is high (relative
to skilled labor) the union can pick a high wage. It also pays to organize more ﬁrms. Firms
diﬀer in their productivity, so when organizing labor the union will select the most proﬁtable
ﬁrms. Those ﬁrms that are not unionized can hire labor in a competitive market.
The analysis builds upon the work of MacDonald and Robinson (1992). They present a
model of the extent of unionization in a competitive industry where all ﬁrms are the same.
The key ingredients of their model are: (i) unionization is a costly activity; (ii) unions must
oﬀer their members a wage net of dues that exceeds the competitive one; (iii) the union wage
must allow organized ﬁrms to make non-negative proﬁts. MacDonald and Robinson (1992)
model an industry in partial equilibrium, and start oﬀ at the level of a ﬁrm’s cost function.
Modeling skill-biased technological change requires delving into a level deeper than the cost
function; i.e., starting oﬀ from a ﬁrm’s production function. Analyzing the implications of
this form of technological change for the economy’s distribution of income necessitates using
a general equilibrium model. MacDonald and Robinson (1992) do not address the question
studied here: What caused the rise and fall of unions in the U.S.?
The hypotheses proposed here is taken to the data in three ways. First, historical evidence
is presented regarding the evolution of unionization and skill-biased technological change,
with particular attention to the transformation of the U.S. economy over the 20th century
by, initially, mass production, and later, computerization. Second, the developed model
is calibrated and simulated to see whether or not it is capable of explaining the extent of
unionization and the level of income inequality that was observed over the course of the
20th century. It is. The required pattern of skill-biased technological progress is in line
with the qualitative picture painted by the historical evidence. Third, statistical analysis is
undertaken, in a panel-data regression framework, that relates the changes in unionization
to skill-biased technological change. Some other potential factors that may have inﬂuenced
unionization, such as an escalation in imports and exports and the intensity of competition,
are controlled for in that analysis. Incorporating these other factors into the developed
general equilibrium model is not desirable, both for reasons of clarity and practicality. The
3statistical evidence suggests that skill-biased technological change, the model’s exogenous
driver, is an important factor for explaining both the recent rise in the relative demand for
skilled labor and the decline of unionization in the U.S.
Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2002) also analyze how skill-biased technological change
can lead to deunionization. Their framework is very diﬀerent from the one developed here.
In particular, there are two sectors in the economy, one unionized, the other non-unionized.
Skilled workers only work in the non-unionized sector. Unskilled labor can work in either
sector. As the productivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers rises more people
choose to become skilled and hence are employed in the non-unionized part of the economy.
Last, their analysis is entirely theoretical in nature. Acikgoz and Kaymak (2011) embed
a model of unionization into a Mortensen-Pissarides style job matching model. In their
framework, workers diﬀer both by their ability and skill levels. Firms observe both attributes,
while unions see only the latter. They argue that a rise in the skill premium, which rewards
both ability and skill, reduces the incentive for a skilled worker to join a union. The rise in
the skill premium is also associated with unskilled workers becoming less productive. This
renders them less attractive for ﬁr m st oh i r ea th i g hu n i o nw a g e s .
2 Mass Production and Computerization
2.1 The Rise of Unions, 1913-1955
Mass production and Fordism were interchangeable terms at one time. In 1913 Ford’s
Highland Park plant became the ﬁrst automobile factory to have a moving assembly line. It
signalled the death of the craft production methods that characterized the previous century.
This was achieved through the use of standardized parts, pioneered in the 19th century
arms industry. Time spent ﬁtting inexact parts was eliminated. The moving assembly line
was also inspired by the ﬂow production techniques used in ﬂour milling and meat packing.
Greater specialization of labor was the result. It reduced the unnecessary handling of the
product associated with ferrying the work between production operations—in early factories
the placement of machines was often organized by their intrinsic operations (say drilling or
4milling) and not by where they lay in the production sequence.
At the beginning of the 20th century, automotive, carriage and wagon, and machine
and metal-working workshops were artisanal in character. They had three types of workers:
skilled mechanics, specialists, and laborers. The skilled mechanics undertook the productive
operations. They supervised the other workers. A census report stated that the “machinist,
in its highest application, means a skilled worker who thoroughly understands the use of
metal-working machinery, as well as ﬁtting and working at the bench with other tools.”
Laborers were unskilled and did “manual labor that requires little or no experience or no
judgement, such as shovelers, loaders, carriers, and general laborers.” The semi-skilled spe-
cialist lay between these two categories. The census referred to them as “machinists, of
inferior skill.” It stated that “those who are able to run only a single machine or perhaps do
a little bench work, are classed as second class machinists and grouped with machine tenders
and machine hands.” Meyer (1981, pp 13-14) describes how Ford engines were put together
just before the assembly line was born:
At the assembly bench, the skilled worker occupied a central place. He began
with a bare motor block, utilized a wide range of mental and manual skills, and
attached part after part. Not only did he assemble parts, but he also ‘ﬁtted’
them. If two parts did not go together, he placed them in his vice and ﬁled them
to ﬁt. The work routines contained variations in tasks and required considerable
amounts of skill and judgment. Additionally, unskilled truckers served the skilled
assemblers. When an assembler completed his engine, a trucker carried it away
and provided a new motor block. The laborer also kept the assembler supplied
with an adequate number of parts and components. Here, the division of labor
was relatively primitive—essentially, the skilled and unskilled. Under normal con-
ditions, a Ford motor assembler needed almost a full day of work to complete a
single engine.
Mass production involved breaking down the manufacturing process into a series of el-
ementary tasks and the transfer of skill to machines. Frederick W. Taylor wrote in 1903
5that “no more should a mechanic be allowed to do the work for which a trained laborer can
be used” and that “a man with only the intelligence of an average laborer can be taught
t h em o s td i ﬃcult and arduous work if it is repeated; and this lower mental caliber renders
him more ﬁt than the mechanic to stand the monotony of repetition.” A 1912 report of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers stated that “after the traditional skill of a trade,
o rt h ep e c u l i a rs k i l lo fad e s i g n e ro ri n v e n t o r ,has been transferred to a machine, an operator
with little or no previously acquired skill can learn to handle it and turn oﬀ the product.”
An 1891 sample of metal-working establishments in Detroit shows the importance of
skilled labor in artisanal production. As Table 1 illustrates, mechanics accounted for 40%
of the workforce. Meyer (1981) feels that this pattern would have been characteristic of the
early Ford Motor Company as well. The composition of the workforce at the Ford Motor
Company had changed by 1913, as Table 2 illustrates. Operators make up the majority of
workers. These were deskilled specialists performing routine machine operations. Mechanics
account for only a small portion of the workforce. The deskilling of the workforce is nicely
related by Wolmack et al. (1990, pg. 31):
The assembler on Ford’s mass production line had only one task—to put two
nuts on two bolts or perhaps attach one wheel to each car. He didn’t order parts,
procure his tools, repair his equipment, inspect for quality, or even understand
what the workers on either side of him were doing. Rather, he kept his head
down and thought about other things. The fact that he might not even speak
the same language as his fellow assemblers or the foreman was irrelevant for the
success of Ford’s system.
Only a few minutes of training was required to teach someone to be an assembler. This
system of manufacturing rapidly diﬀused through the American economy. The pinnacle of
t h em a s sp r o d u c t i o ne r aw a s1 9 5 5 .
Before proceeding on to a discussion about the decline of unionization, a caveat is in order.
While the analysis here stresses the role that mass production played in driving unionization,
6changes in labor laws undoubtedly contributed to the very rapid rise in unionization that
occurred during the 1930s and 1940s. The shifts in labor laws for this period are chronicled
in Ohanian (2009). He also analyzes their impact on the Great Depression. Union wages
were required to be paid on federal public works contracts by the Davis—Bacon Act in 1931.
The Norris—Laguardia Act, which was passed in 1932, limited the power of courts to issue
injunctions against union strikes, picketing, or boycotts. It also outlawed “yellow dog”
contracts. These contracts prohibited workers from joining a union; they could be ﬁred if
they did. The Wagner Act of 1935 provided for collective bargaining and placed very few
restrictions on the rights of workers to strike. Some of the rights that unions had won during
the 1930s were rolled by back by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. It outlawed closed shops,
required an 80 day notice for strikes, allowed states to pass right to work laws, among other
things. Of course, the dawning of the mass production era may have provided a catalyst
for enacting such laws. Doepke and Tertilt (2009) discuss how technological progress, which
increased the importance of education, may have led to an expansion of women’s rights.
Similarly, one could argue that a rise in the strength of unions may increase the demand
for technologies that place less reliance on unionized labor. All of these considerations are
abstracted from here.
2.2 The Fall of Unions, 1955-
In 1952 MIT publicly demonstrated an automatic milling machine. The machine read in-
structions from a paper punch tape. The instructions were fed to servo-motors guiding the
position of the cutting head of the machine relative to the part being manufactured along the
,  and  axes. Feedback from sensors regulated the process. By changing the instructions
the machine could manufacture a diﬀerent part. Such a “ﬂexible machine” could make small
batches of many diﬀerent parts. The world had entered the age of numerically controlled
machines. Numerically controlled machines were slow to catch on. The MIT machine would
not have been reliable for commercial production; it had 250 vacuum tubes, 175 relays, and
numerous moving parts. Programming an early numerically controlled machine was a time
7consuming task. Standardized languages had been developed for programming automated
machine tools by the 1960s. At the same time the arrival of less expensive computers in the
1960s made them economical. The separation of software from hardware also lowered the
costs of implementing numerical control systems. As calculating power increased, comput-
ers could aid the design of products (CAD). Computers could also be used for planning and
managing business in addition to running the machines on the factory ﬂoor (computer-aided
manufacturing or CAM). In fact, sometimes they could automate virtually the entire busi-
ness (computer-integrated manufacturing or CIM). The use of computers reduced the need
for unskilled labor in factories and oﬃces.
Mass production is an inﬂexible system. It is diﬃcult to change a product or the man-
ufacturing procedure once an assembly line has been instituted. As Henry Ford said “Any
customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black.” This didn’t
suit Japanese manufacturing in the early postwar period, which had small production runs.
The dies (or the forms) used in presses to shape metal parts had to be switched frequently.
It took specialists in an American plant a day to change dies. Dies weighed tons and had
to be set in the presses with absolute precision. Otherwise, defects would appear in the
manufactured parts. In the 1940s and 50s, Taiichi Ohno, Toyota’s chief production engineer,
perfected a simple system where they could be changed in minutes. Since the presses had to
remain idle while the dies where changed, Ohno reasoned that the production workers could
do this. Furthermore, they could check the manufactured parts for defects thereby catching
mistakes early on in production process. Quality control was at the end of the process in
the typical mass production facility. Over time, Toyota gradually evolved to a process where
teams of workers were responsible for segments of the assembly line. Besides production,
they looked after housekeeping, minor machine repairs and quality checking for their section
of the line. According to Wolmack et al. (1990) in a mass production automobile plant about
20% of area and 25% of working time are devoted to ﬁxing mistakes. This is eliminated in
a Toyota “lean production” facility. The Toyota production system favors skilled workers
rather than unskilled ones. It has now been widely adopted in manufacturing.













































Figure 2: Ratio unskilled to skilled workers, 1860 to 1990—see the Appendix for a discussion
of the data sources used in this ﬁgure
The upshot of computerization in production and new organizational structures was that
the demand for unskilled labor fell relative to the demand for skilled labor. This is shown in
Figure 2, where unskilled workers are deﬁned as clerical workers, laborers, operatives, and
sales personnel, while skilled ones are taken to be craftsmen, managers, and professionals.
Skilled-biased technological progress favored unskilled labor during the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e
20th century. Since unskilled labor is more homogenous than skilled labor, it is easier
to organize. Therefore, unionization occurred historically in occupations and industries
that attracted unskilled labor. While the ﬁrst part of the 20th century witnessed a rise in
unionization, starting in the mid-1950’s skill-biased technological change dislocated unskilled
workers replacing them with mixes of capital and skilled workers. Therefore, in the second
half of the century, industries and professions with higher initial unionization rates should in
general exhibit larger declines in employment than those with lower initial unionization rates,
because these industries and professions had disproportionately bigger shares of unskilled
labor.
9Over the period 1983 to 2002, for which annual unionization rates by occupation and
industry are available from the Union Membership and Coverage Database,t h eu n i o nm e m -
bership rate in the U.S. declined nearly 34%, from 20.1 to 13.3%—the Appendix contains a
description of the various data sources used in this paper.2 In manufacturing the decline
was more pronounced. The union membership rate fell from 27.8 to 14.3%, a decline of
nearly 50%. Now, highly unionized occupations were especially hard hit. Table 3 lists the
unionization rates for the 20 fastest declining and growing occupations between 1983 and
2002. The 20 fastest declining occupations consist mainly of laborers, machine operators,
and clerical workers, and as many as 10 of these occupations had a 1983 unionization rate
that was in the top quartile of the 1983 unionization rate across occupations. In contrast, of
the 20 fastest growing occupations, only 4 had a unionization rate that was in this quartile.
These occupations largely pertain to skilled technical workers, such as engineers, managers,
and other professionals.
As a prelude to the more formal statistical analysis that is undertaken in Section 7, the
following question is asked: Did industries and occupations with higher initial unionization
rates in 1983 experience greater employment losses?3 The answer should be yes, if skilled-
biased technological change reduced the demand for unskilled labor, which in turn was
disproportionately represented in the unionized sector of the economy. In other words, the
initial unionization rate in an industry or occupation can be viewed as a proxy for the
degree of proneness of that industry or occupation to employment loss due to skill-biased
technological change. This hypothesized link between employment growth patterns and
unionization rates is tested using data on unionization for U.S. occupations and industries
between 1983 and 2002.
The connection between unionization and employment growth in an occupation is ex-
plored in Table 4, which presents regression estimates of the relationship between the per-
2 See Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) for details on the Union Membership and Coverage Database.
3 The earliest year for which data on unionization is available in the Union Membership and Coverage
Database is 1983. The focus on 1983-2002 period is primarily due to the fact that detailed industry and
occupation codes before 1983 and after 2002 cannot be made consistent with those during this period.
10centage growth rate in employment in an occupation between 1983 and 2002, on the one
hand, and the initial percentage unionization rate and the percentage growth rate in union-
ization, on the other hand. The initial unionization rate is measured by either the percentage
of union members in an occupation or the percentage covered by a union.4 The estimated
coeﬃcients for the initial union membership and coverage rates are all negative, but for one
case. Furthermore, all but two estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Em-
ployment growth is also positively associated with growth in union membership or coverage.
One might expect that as union membership drops so might employment, since the former
contributes to labor in the industry. For speciﬁcations 3 and 4 (across the three panels in
the table), a 1 percentage point increase in the initial unionization rate is associated with a
02 to 05 percentage point decline in employment growth.5
Table 5 repeats the analysis in Table 4 using percentage growth in employment in an
industry as the dependent variable. These industry-level regressions also control for the
percentage growth in real output and the percentage growth in labor productivity (real
output per worker), which are also expected to matter for changes in industry employment.
These growth rates are calculated over the period 1982 to 2002, using the closest economic
census year (1982) to the earliest year data is available on unionization, 1983.6 The
main conclusions from Table 4 prevail. Employment growth is negatively associated with
the initial unionization rate and positively associated with growth in unionization. The
estimated coeﬃcient of the initial unionization rate is much higher compared with Table
4. For speciﬁcations 3 and 4 (across the panels), a 1 percentage point increase in the
initial unionization rate corresponds to a 12 to 15 percentage point decline in an industry’s
employment growth rate over the sample period.
4 The percentage growth rate in unionization is calculated slightly diﬀerently. Let  denote number of
union members or those covered by a union in year . The percentage growth rate of  is calculated as
100 × 2 × (2002 − 1983)(2002 + 1983) to accommodate the few cases where 1983 is zero.
5 These within-occupation regressions results are also consistent with the Hirsch’s (2008) ﬁnding that
changes in union density within an occupation, rather than a change in the composition of jobs, account for
a larger portion of the decline in unionization.
6 The 2002 sales are deﬂated to 1982 dollars using the CPI.
11Overall, these preliminary ﬁndings support the hypothesis that in recent times highly
unionized industries and occupations have been more prone to employment loss. This con-
stitutes indirect evidence on the connection between unionization and technological change.
The statistical analysis conducted in Section 7 provides more direct statistical evidence on
the link between skill-biased technological change and unionization in light of the model
presented next.
3 The Setting




−1 lnc with 0 1,
where c represents household consumption in period . The family is made up of a continuum
of members with a mass of one. Each household member supplies one unit of labor. A
fraction  of these members are skilled, the rest unskilled.7 A skilled worker earns the
wage rate . Unskilled members may work in the unionized part of the labor force or in the
non-unionized one. A unionized worker earns the wage rate , while a non-unionized one
receives . The fraction of unskilled household members that work during period  in the
unionized part of the labor force is ,av a r i a b l et h a tm u s tb ed e termined in equilibrium.
The household saves in the form of physical capital, k. A unit of physical capital earns the
rental  in period . Capital depreciates over time at the rate . Finally, the household
7 The relative supply of skilled versus unskilled labor is assumed to be ﬁxed over time. There is no doubt
that supply shifts have occurred over the course of history, in particular due both to changes in the return
from and the cost of an education (the latter due to changes in its public provision). The model abstracts
from these supply eﬀects. Research on the evolution of the skilled-to-non-skilled wage premium over the
20th century indicates that skill-biased technological change played a very important role—see Goldin and
Katz (2008) and Krusell et al. (2000). More generally, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) document how
times of rapid technological progress are often associated with shifts in the income distribution. The concept
of skill cannot be mapped straightforwardly into years of education. As Goldin and Katz (2008) note, a high
school degree would have been considered well-educated in 1915, while to be labeled this today would require
a college degree or more. See Restuccia and Vandebroucke (2011) for a model of the rise in educational
attainment.
12earns proﬁts, π,f r o mt h eﬁr m st h a ti to w n s . 8
There is a distribution of ﬁrms in the economy with unit mass. In period  a ﬁrm produces





 +( 1− )()
]
 with 0 + 1
where  represents the amount of capital hired,  denotes the input of unskilled labor and
 is the quantity of skilled labor. The variable  is a neutral shift factor for the technology
that is common across ﬁrms. A ﬁrm-speciﬁc shift factor is given by 1.T h i sd e n o t e sa
ﬁrm’s type and is drawn at the beginning of time from a Pareto distribution
 ∼ () ≡

+1 for 1
where  is the density function for a Pareto distribution.
Observe that skilled and unskilled labor are aggregated via a CES production function.
The technology variables  and  change over time and will capture the notion of skill-
biased technological change.9 There are diminishing returns to scale in production (since
 + 1). There is a ﬁxed cost  associated with operating a ﬁrm. As will be seen, the
combination of diminishing returns to scale in production and a ﬁxed operating cost ensure
that it is not desirable to organize all the ﬁrms in the economy.
Finally, there is a union in the economy. The union organizes unskilled labor in ﬁrms. An
organized ﬁrm must use union labor. The union believes in equality so all union members
are paid the same wage, . Unionization is a costly activity. Speciﬁcally, the period- cost






8 Variables in bold represent economy-wide aggregates that will need to be distinguished from the anal-
ogous ﬁrm-level quantities. The aggregate capital stock and level of proﬁts represent the sum of capital
stocks and proﬁts across all ﬁrms, respectively. One can think of aggregate consumption as the total of all
households’ consumptions.
9 It may be uncommon to let  vary over time. Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (forthcoming) do
something similar in their study of how labor’s share of income ﬂuctuates over the business cycle.
13where  is the number of union members. These costs are recovered from the membership
in the form of dues, . Skilled labor is not unionized. In the real world, this may be because
it is too heterogenous in nature to organize, eﬀectively, a mass of people to bargain for a




−1( −  − )

1−
 ,w i t h0  1.
These preferences presume that the union has two regards. It values the surplus that a
union member will earn over a non-unionized worker,  − −,a sw e l la st h en u m b e ro f
unionized workers, , that will receive it. As will be seen, there is a tradeoﬀ involved with
these two regards. A survey of the theory of unions is contained in Oswald (1985).
4 Decision Problems
4.1 Households
The problem facing the representative family is standard, with due alteration for the setting
under study. Speciﬁcally, the household desires to maximize its lifetime utility subject to









c + k+1 =( 1−  − ) + ( − )+ +(  +1− )k + π (for  =1 2···)
In the above maximization problem the household takes the number of union members, ,
as given. Since  −  , it would like as many unskilled household members as possible
to be employed in union ﬁrms.
144.2 Firms
A ﬁrm in period  hires capital, , and skilled and unskilled labor,  and , to maximize






























for  = .P ( 2 )
With some abuse of notation, the variable  in superscript form will denote whether the
ﬁrm is unionized ( = )o rn o t(  = ), while the variable  in regular form will represent
the wage rate (again for  = ). Now, express the solution to the above problem for the





for  =  —t h e“ ·” represents the other arguments that enter the function ,w h i c ha r e
suppressed to keep the subsequent presentation simple. Likewise, represent the amount of



















P r o d u c t i o ni sn o taf o r g o n ec o n c l u s i o nd u et ot h ep r e s e n c eo ft h eﬁxed operation cost,






(;·) ≥ 0 for  = .
Denote the period- threshold value for , at which it is just proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to produce,
by 






;·)=0  for  = .( 1 )










;·)  0 for 

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1(1−),f o r = .( 2 )




,i naﬁrm depends on the price of unskilled
labor relative to skilled labor, . It also depends on the skill-biased technology term


(1 − ). This term captures the notion of skill-biased technological change in the
model. When 

(1 − ) is low, either because  is small or  is high, unskilled labor
is favored, relatively speaking. The beneﬁt of unionizing unskilled workers will be large.
Equation (2) will be used in part of the statistical analysis.
Now consider the move toward assembly line production at the beginning of the 20th
century (and away from the artisanal production techniques of the 19th century). This is







)1−. A movement toward assembly line techniques can be represented
by an upward shift in [(1−)

], due either to a fall in  or a rise in .I tw i l lc a u s et h e
slope of an isoquant to increase along a ray from the origin. This is shown by the shift in
the isoquant from  to . As a consequence, at a given skill ratio, an extra unit of unskilled
labor becomes more valuable in terms of skilled labor. If factor prices remained ﬁxed, then
the ﬁrm would substitute away from skilled labor toward unskilled labor, as reﬂected by the
movement from  to 0 in the diagram.
4.3 The Union
Recall that the union has two regards. First, it values the surplus over the competitive wage
that union members earn. Second, it also puts worth on the number of workers that will earn
the union wage. It is intuitive that the union should organize the ﬁrms with the highest level
of productivity ﬁrst. They can better aﬀord to pay the union premium. There is a limit to
the wage that the union can set. Speciﬁcally, a unionized ﬁrm must earn nonnegative proﬁts.
So, if any unionized ﬁrm earns zero proﬁts then all ﬁrms with a higher level of productivity
will be unionized and those with a lower level will not. Because more productive ﬁrms are
also larger in the model, the union organizes larger ﬁrms. This prediction of the model is
consistent with studies indicating higher likelihood of unionization among larger ﬁrms.10








Figure 3: Skilled-biased technological change: unskilled labor becomes more favored when
the isoquant shifts from  to , say due to the introduction of assembly line production
techniques
17Now, turn to the optimization problem faced by a union. Assume that the proﬁts of the
last ﬁrm unionized are squeezed to zero. The number of unionized workers in period , ,













































subject to the zero-proﬁt constraint (1) holding (when  = )f o rt h em a r g i n a lu n i o nﬁrm,

 . When solving this problem, the union takes the wages for non-unionized unskilled and
skilled labor,  and ,a sg i v e n .
Is it possible that the union won’t pick the wage rate so that the threshold ﬁrm earns
zero proﬁts? The answer is no. Suppose that the marginal ﬁrm earned positive proﬁts. The
cost of raising the union wage incrementally is the loss of membership that will occur from
all of the inframarginal ﬁrms. It turns out, though, that this loss can be made up for by
increasing the number of unionized ﬁrms or lowering 
 .H o w f a r c a n  be raised and 

simultaneously lowered? At some point the ﬁrms with the lowest 
 will no longer be able to
earn proﬁts due to the presence of the ﬁxed cost . Then the process must stop. Without
the ﬁxed cost, ,e v e r yﬁrm would be unionized. In this situation, all ﬁrms would earn some
proﬁts, albeit for some of them they might be inﬁnitesimally small. In general not all of the
unskilled work force will be hired.
Lemma 1 (Zero proﬁts for the marginal ﬁrm) The union always picks the wage rate, ,s o
that the zero-proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t( 1 )i sb i n d i n g( w h e n = ) for the last ﬁrm organized.
Proof. See Appendix.
18The union’s two regards must be traded oﬀ in the maximization problem P(3). By
applying the envelope theorem to a unionized ﬁrm’s optimization problem P(2), for  = ,












This implies that lowering the threshold hold, 
 , or equivalently unionizing more ﬁrms, can
only be accomplished by reducing the union wage, . Additionally, it can be seen from




(;·)(), comes at the expense of
higher dues, , because of the increasing costs involved with unionization.
5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium the markets for capital, labor and goods must clear. Equilibrium in the













 ()() = k (5)













()() =  (6)













 ()() =1−  (7)
Last, equilibrium in the goods market implies













()() +( 1− )k (8)
Note that the aggregate amount of union dues, , appears in the resource constraint.
These exactly cover the resource cost of organizing— see (4).
Ad e ﬁnition of the equilibrium under study will now be presented to take stock of the
situation so far.
19Deﬁnition 2 (Deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is a time
path for consumption and savings, {ck+1}∞
=1, a set of labor and capital allocations for







=1,as e to ff a c t o rp r i c e s
{   }∞
=1, a sequence for union dues, {}∞
=1, and a sequence determining the thresh-
old points for union and non-union ﬁrms, {
 
 }∞
=1, such that for a given time proﬁle for
technology {  }∞
=1:
1. The time path for consumption and savings, {ck+1}∞
=1, solves the representative
























=1, solve their proﬁt
maximization problems, as speciﬁed by P(2), given the time paths for factor prices,
{  }∞
=1 (for  = ) and technology {  }∞
=1.
3. The sequences for union wages, {}∞
=1 and the threshold, {
 }∞
=1, solve the union’s
problem P(3), given the time paths for factor prices, {  }∞
=1 (for  = ),
technology, {  }∞





(;·), as implied by P(2). The sequence for union dues,
{}∞
=1, is determined in line with (4).
4. The sequence for non-union thresholds, {
 }∞
=1, solves (1) when  = ,g i v e n
 ()=
Π
 (;·) from P(2) and the time paths for factor prices, {  }∞
=1,a n dt e c h n o l -
ogy, {  }∞
=1.
5. The markets for capital, labor and goods, all clear so that equations (5) to (8) hold.
6 Simulation Analysis
6.1 Calibration
Before the model can be simulated values must be assigned for its parameters. Table 6 lists
the parameter values. The period is taken to be ﬁve years. Accordingly, the discount factor
is set so  =1 (104)5, which implies an annual interest rate of 4%. This is a standard
value. The annual depreciation rate for capital is taken to be 0.08, another standard value.
Likewise, labor’s share of income is set at 60%, implying  =0 60, another typical value if
one assumes that part of the capital stock includes intangibles. Note that a ﬁrm’s production
20function exhibits diminishing returns to scale. Guner, Ventura and Xi (2008) estimate that
the share of proﬁts in output is 20%. Capital’s share of income, ,i st h e r e f o r es e ta t020.
Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor is 1.4. This corresponds to a value of 029 for .
T h er e s to ft h em o d e l ’ sp a r a m e t e r sa r es e l e c t e ds ot h a tas t e a d ys t a t ef o rt h em o d e l
hits 5 data targets for the year 1955. This is the peak of the unionization movement. This
involves computing the model’s steady state in conjunction with the 5 data targets while
taking the 5 parameters 1955, , ,  and  as additional variables. The technology variable
 is normalized to one for 1955 so that 1955 =1 .T h eﬁrst target is the fraction of population
that was unionized. In 1955 this was 32%. Therefore, the steady state is computed subject
to the restriction
1955 =0 32
Let the top 10% of the population represent skilled labor. Thus,  =0 10.T h es h a r eo ft h e
top 10% of the work force in earnings was 032. Therefore, the steady state must satisfy the
condition

 +( 1−  − ) + 
=0 32
Union dues are assumed to amount to 1% of a union member’s wages. MacDonald and
Robinson (1992, p 47) state that this is a reasonable value. Indeed, this is exactly what the




The distribution of employment across establishments in the U.S. is very tight. Henley and
Sanchez (2009, p 427) report that the coeﬃcient of variation across U.S. establishments
was 8% in 1974. It remained relatively constant after that. This observation is targeted
to provide guidance for the choice of the Pareto distribution parameter .N e x t ,t h ew a g e






Can the model explain the ∩-shaped pattern of union membership along with the ∪-shaped
proﬁle for income inequality that were observed over the 20th century? To investigate
this question requires inputting in a time series process for technology, {}2000
=1920.A
perfect foresight path for the model is calculated using a variant of the Fair and Taylor
(1983) algorithm, which is useful for computing saddle path solutions for two-point boundary
value problems. The Fair and Taylor (1983) algorithm is a relative of the multiple shooting
algorithm used to solve diﬀerence equation systems. The ﬁrst boundary condition for the
economy is the initial capital stock, while the second one is capital stock associated with the
terminal steady state.
The process for {}2000
=1920 is constructed in a crude way. Steady states for the model
are computed for 1920 and 2000, the starting and ending years for the analysis. Union mem-
bership and income inequality are taken as targets for these years. Solutions for  and  that
hit these targets are backed out, while holding all other parameter values ﬁxed. Assume that
 and  are separately quadratic in . Each quadratic will have three parameters. Fit these
t w oq u a d r a t i c st ot h et r i p l e t s(1920 1955 2000) and (192019552000), respectively. The re-
sulting time proﬁle for skill-biased technological change, as represent by [

(1−)]1(1−),
is shown in Figure 4. After the year 2000 all technological change is shut oﬀ.T h ec a p i t a l
stocks associated with the 1920 and 2000 steady states are taken as the initial and terminal
capital stocks when computing the transitional dynamics for the model, although the model
n e e d st ob er u nf o rs o m e w h a tm o r et h a n8 0y e a r st or e a c ht h eﬁnal steady state.
Is the pattern of skill-biased technological change shown in Figure 4 reasonable? The
extent of the required shift is quite modest, 25% from peak to trough. Over the 1920 to 2000
period real per-capita income grew by 2.25% a y e a r .T h i si m p l i e st h a tr e a lp e r - c a p i t aG D P
rose by a factor of 6. To achieve this in the model, the neutral technological shift factor,
, must rise by a factor of 61(1−) =9 4.( T h eﬁxed cost, , needs to rise by a factor of 6
so that the economy would remain on a balanced growth path in the absence of changes in
 and .) Therefore, skill-biased technological change is swamped by neutral technological
22Figure 4: Technological Change, model










 . All the observer would see is a seemingly smooth
rise in TFP, as Figure 4 illustrates. He would not notice the tiny wiggles associated with
skill-biased technological change.
The framework does a good job accounting for the rise and fall in union membership,
as Figure 5 illustrates. It also mimics the fall and rise in income equality as well. This is
shown in Figure 6. In the analysis, skilled-biased technological change is the sole driver of
both the ∩-shaped time series for unionization and the ∪-shaped one for income inequality;
i.e., the ∪-shaped pattern in income inequality is not caused by the ∩-shaped time series for
unionization. By this account, very little of postwar rise in inequality can be accounted for
by the decline in unionization. Goldin and Katz (2008), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997),













































Figure 5: Union Membership over the 20th Century, data and model
and Krusell at el. (2000) all stress technological change as a force underlying shifts in the
income distribution.11
6.3 Welfare Cost of Unions
So, what is the welfare cost of unions? Rees (1963) asked this question a long time ago.
He found that the welfare loss from unions in 1957 amounted to 0.14% of GDP. The model
developed here can be used to address this question. Suppose that the model economy is
resting in its 1955 steady state, the peak of the union power. Now, eliminate unions. The
model would then imply a welfare increase of 0.38% of GDP. While this is 2.7 times as big
as Rees’s number, it is paltry.
Figure 7 illustrates the situation in an alternative Reesian fashion. The picture draws
11 A drop in unionization has a minor impact on income inequality in the model. As will be seen in the
next section, this is due to the facts that: (i) the union wage premium is of moderate size; (ii) it applies to a
relatively small part of the aggregate wage bill; (iii) a fall in union wages for unskilled workers implies a rise
in nonunion wages. Hence, a drop in unionization does not account for the large observed shifts in income
inequality in the model. In fact, if one assumes that all unskilled workers get the non-union wage then the
plot obtained for the income distribution looks virtually identical to that displayed in Figure 6.






























Figure 6: The Distribution of Income over the 20th Century, data and model
the demands for unskilled labor by both union and non-union ﬁrms. These demands must
sum up to 0.9, the size of the unskilled labor force as a proportion of the total labor force.
In the economy without unions, the union ﬁrms would hire 0.42% of the total labor force
(including skilled labor) at the competitive wage rate .U n i o n si n c r e a s et h i sw a g et o.A s
a consequence, unionized ﬁrms cut their employment of unskilled labor from 0.42% of the
total labor force to 0.32%. This leads to a welfare loss measured by the area .B u t ,t h e
labor displaced by union ﬁr m si sp i c k e du pb yn o n - u n i o no n e s .T h ew a g er a t ef o rn o n u n i o n
labor falls from  to . The gain in welfare from the increased employment by non-union
ﬁrms is represented by the area . The net loss is the area in the triangle .T h i s
triangle represents the diﬀerence in productivities between the unionized and non-unionized
ﬁrms. It amounts to 05 × 015 ×  × (042 − 032). Expressing this as a percentage of
aggregate output, o,g i v e s
100% ×
05 × 015 ×  × (042 − 032)
o
=1 0 0 % × 05 ×
015 ×  × 032




032 | {z }
031
=0 32%
25This number is slightly smaller than the model’s ﬁgure of 038% It is easy to see why this
number is small. First, the union premium, 015, only applies to small part of wage bill
expressed as a fraction of output,  × 032. This represents the base of the triangle.
Second, the proportional shift in union labor, (042 − 032)032, is not that large. This is
t h eh e i g h to ft h et r i a n g l e .N o t et h a tt h i st r i a n g l ee s t i m a t ei se x t r e m e l yc l o s et ot h eg e n e r a l
equilibrium one. Some of the details of Rees’s (1963) estimation are not clear. First, it is
unclear how he obtains the magnitude of his shift in labor demand. Second, it is hard to tell
whether his estimated shift in labor should refer to the length  or the length .I fi ti st h e
later, as it seems from the context he took the number from, then it is too large. Doing an
appropriate correction would yield something around 0.07% of GDP. The diﬀerence between
Rees’s estimate and the current one derives from a diﬀerence in the implied elasticities for
labor demands.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h ew e l f a r ec o s to fu n i o n si ss os m a l ld o e sn o ti m p l yt h a tt h e yh a v el i t t l e
eﬀect on the economy. The impact that unions have on economy here is restricted by the
assumption that ﬁrms are competitive. Whether or not this is a good approximation for
the U.S. economy across the time period studied is an open question. Perfect competition
limits the wages that unions can obtain. Unions are more likely to have a large impact
on economic activity when they are negotiating with producers that have monopoly power.
This was the case in U.S. iron market prior to the 1970s. After this time, producers faced
intense competition from foreign exporters. Schmitz (2005) documents how this increased
competition led to a large rise in labor productivity. Firms were forced to abandon the
productivity-hindering work practices that they had negotiated with unions earlier. His
story might also apply at points in time to the aircraft, airline, auto industries, for example.
In a similar vein, Cole and Ohanian (2004) study the detrimental impact that unions had
on the economy during the Great Depression. They stress the cartelization of industries
allowed by Roosevelt under the New Deal, which were then abandoned prior to World War
II. Taschereau-Dumouchel (2011) argues that just the threat of unionization may be enough
to generate large welfare costs. To keep unions out, ﬁrms have to oﬀer high wages to low-
26Figure 7: The welfare loss from unions
27skilled workers in his model.
7 Empirical Evidence
Is skill-biased technological change an empirically relevant factor in the decline of unioniza-
tion in the U.S.? This question will be examined in two ways. First, the model predicts that
the ratio of skilled labor to non-skilled labor should increase with skill-biased technological





related to the term that captures skill-biased technological change, 

(1 − ). Second,
the fraction of the labor force that is unionized, , is negatively related to skill-biased tech-
nological progress, as the simulation analysis established. To test these two predictions, a
measure of skill-biased technological change is needed.
Measures of skill-biased technological progress are diﬃcult to come by. The macroeco-
nomics literature, in particular Krusell at el. (2000), suggests that the relative price of new
capital goods is one measure. In a famous paper, Solow (1960) argued that technological
progress is embodied in the form of new capital goods, which is now commonly referred to
as investment-speciﬁc technological progress. Investment-speciﬁc technological progress is
incarnated in new technologies, such as more powerful computers, faster and more eﬃcient
means of telecommunication, and numerically-controlled industrial machines. As new tech-
nologies come on line, they tend to become less expensive due to process innovation and the
entry of competitors. Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) illustrate how investment-
speciﬁc technological progress manifests itself in the form of decreasing relative prices for
new capital goods, measured in terms of consumption goods. Again, Krusell at el. (2000)
suggest that the decline in the relative price of capital goods is a driver of skill-biased techno-
logical progress. Now, diﬀerent industries use diﬀerent mixes of capital goods. If skill-biased
technological change is embodied in the form of new capital goods, then one hypothesis is
that those industries where the price of new capital goods falls the quickest should exhibit
the fastest rates of de-unionization.
Calculating the relative price of new capital goods at the industry level, in quality-
28adjusted terms, is not a straightforward task. Cummins and Violante (2002) have done
this calculation for equipment and software (E&S). Their price series will be used here.12
E&S include four major groups: industrial equipment, transportation equipment, oﬃce
information processing equipment, and other equipment. Technological progress in E&S is
viewed as complementing skilled workers more so than unskilled workers. Compared with
other candidate measures, such as the stock of E&S or real investment in E&S, the Cummins
and Violante (2002) relative price series take into account the quality improvements in E&S
over time, and it measures the quality-adjusted price of E&S with respect to the price of
constant-quality consumption goods. The connections between skill-biased technological
progress, on the one hand, and investment in E&S or the stock of E&S, on the other, are
likely to be more ambiguous in nature. An increase in investment or the stock of E&S
may be associated, for instance, with an expansion in industry output, but not necessarily
with an advance in technology favoring skilled workers. Furthermore, as higher quality and
more advanced E&S becomes available at lower prices, conventionally-measured total real
investment in, or the stock of E&S may not show much of a rise and could actually decrease.
Investment and the capital stock are also more subject to endogeneity issues. The rapid
decline in the price of E&S is likely to occur from technological progress, which can be taken
as exogenous with respect to the process of change in unionization and the composition of
skill in the economy.
7.1 Skill Composition and Skill-biased Technological Change






















,f o r =  (9)
The term 

(1−) captures skill-biased technological progress, while  is the relative
price of unskilled labor with respect to skilled labor.
12 See Cummins and Violante (2002) for the details on the construction of this relative price series.




, is the ratio of non-production workers to production
workers in a ﬁrm. This ratio is readily available at the industry level annually for manufac-
turing industries from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. The deﬁnition of
non-production workers is rather broad: it lumps together managers, professionals such as
engineers and lawyers, and many other employees who are not directly involved in produc-
tion. On average, non-production workers’ wages are much higher than production workers’
wages.13 One may argue that non-production workers embody more skill or human capital
than production workers, at least on average. Denote by  the ratio of non-production
workers to production workers in industry  for year  Based on (9), one can consider a
panel regression of the form
ln =  ln +  ln + λlnX +  +  +  (10)
The panel regression (10) is implemented at the industry level.14 In (10),  is the relative
price of equipment and software that measures the state of skill-biased technological change in
industry  for year .  is the inverse of the price ratio calculated by Cummins and Violante
(2002). Based on the model, the expected sign of ln is negative: as the relative price of
equipment and software declines—indicating skill-biased technological progress—the skilled-
to-non-skilled labor ratio should increase.  is the ratio of the average wage of production
workers to that of non-production workers, which should have a positive association with
13 For instance, in the 1997 Census of Manufactures, the average wage of production workers was about
$21,000, compared with about $39,000 for non-production workers, a diﬀerence that is also highly statistically
signiﬁcant. In NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, the ratio of the average wage of non-production
workers to that of production workers ranges from 114 to 243 across 2-digit manufacturing industries during
the 1958-1999 period.




 is identical across ﬁrms
for a given  =  but diﬀers across unionized and non-unionized ﬁrms because of the diﬀerent relative
wages. One could aggregate equation (9) to the industry level. Speciﬁcally, let  = (1−) be the fraction
of unskilled labor in unionized ﬁrms. The logarithm of the industry-level ratio,  is then given by
ln()=l n [ (
 
 )+( 1− )(
 
 )]
=l n [ 

(1 − )]1(1−) +l n [  ()
1(1−) +( 1− )()
1(1−)]
This relationship is approximated here by the form given in (10).
30.15 X is a vector of industry-year varying controls,  is a year ﬁxed eﬀect,  is an
industry ﬁxed eﬀect, and  is an error term.16 The error terms are allowed to be clustered
within industries. The ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation in (10) can be estimated using the balanced
panel of 19 two-digit manufacturing industries available from the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database o v e rt h es a m p l ep e r i o d1958 to 1999.17 The panel estimation at the
industry level is also motivated by the fact that a large portion of the decline in unionization
in the U.S. took place as a result of the fall of unionization within sectors rather than as a
result of the changing distribution of employment across sectors, as documented by Hirsch
(2008).
Real output is included in X to measure the eﬀect of the scale in the industry on .
Labor productivity is also added to capture the eﬀect of general improvements in industry la-
bor productivity on . The model features a ﬁrm-level production technology that exhibits
neutral-technological advance in addition to skill-biased technological progress. Along a bal-
anced growth path, neutral technological change will not aﬀect . However, the data may
exhibit deviations from the clinical model environment. For instance, imagine a situation
where the demand is ﬁxed in an industry but where there is neutral technological progress.
One would expect a fall in this industry’s employment. If the production technology does
not exhibit constant returns to scale, then this fall may have a diﬀerential impact on skilled
versus unskilled labor. Skilled and unskilled labor may have diﬀerent costs of moving across
industries. Hence, variations in industry demands and production technologies may induce
15 In the general equilibrium model, the skill premium,  for  =  , is endogenous. Loosely
speaking, it will be a function of the technology parameters  , and the aggregate capital stock, —see
the deﬁnition given for a competitive equilibrium. Therefore, the skill premium will, in part, embed the
eﬀects of skill-biased technological change. This would be true in the real world as well, of course. The
wage ratio  can also be inﬂuenced by other exogenous factors. The inclusion of  in the regression also
controls for the inﬂuence that these considerations have on the skill mix through the skill premium.
16 See Wooldridge (2002, Section 10.5) for a discussion of this panel regression and the assumptions for
consistent estimation of the parameters.
17 The sample period ends in 1999, the last year for which the relative price measure for industries is
available from Cummins and Violante (2002). The relative price is available at the two-digit SIC code level
only, so the analysis is restricted to two-digit SIC code manufacturing industries. In addition, one two-digit
industry is not included in the estimation because it is not in the Cummins and Violante (2002) data.
31changes in the relative employment of skilled and unskilled labor. Industry scale and labor
productivity are used as controls for some of these potential deviations.
The real capital stock and the conventionally-measured real price of investment are also
added as controls. While  does not depend on the capital stock, the data may exhibit
deviations. In a more general formulation, skilled-biased technological change could operate
through the capital stock (which will be inﬂuenced by the price of investment). Furthermore,
if  measures the quality of capital to an extent not possible by conventional measures of the
capital stock and its price, then any signiﬁcant connection between  and  should survive
the addition of these controls. Finally, in (10), the relative price of E&S, , is treated as
exogenous to . For a robustness check on this assumption, the regression analysis in (10)
is also implemented using a two-stages least square (2SLS) IV estimation framework. The
instruments used are the one-period lagged values of the logarithms of , the wage ratio,
real output, labor productivity, the real capital stock, the number of establishments per
capita, and the real price of investment.
Between 1958 and 1999, the average of  across the two-digit manufacturing industries
in the sample grew from 029 to 039 an increase of 31% In the meantime, the average of
 across the same group fell sharply from 083 to 014 a decrease of 83% Table 7 contains
the results of the estimation based on (10). In all the speciﬁcations displayed in Table
7, a statistically signiﬁcant negative association between ln and ln emerges. Across
speciﬁcations with controls (speciﬁcations 2 to 10), a 1% decline in  is connected with
a 016% to 041% increase in  The eﬀect of the wage ratio, ,o n is positive, as
expected, and is statistically signiﬁcant. The industry elasticity of  with respect to 
ranges between 138 to 193.18 The eﬀects of real output and labor productivity vary across
speciﬁcations, but in general there does not seem to be a consistently signiﬁcant link between
these two variables and . The real capital stock has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on 
whereas the real price of investment has a negative impact, although it is signiﬁcant only in
18 This implies an industry-level value for the parameter  in the range 027 to 048, which also contains
the ﬁrm-level value  =0 29 used in the model’s calibration.
32speciﬁcation 10. Because  can be viewed as a measure of the price of investment/capital,
its connection with  is expected to weaken when other measures related to capital and its
price are included in the regression. This is the case in speciﬁcations 7 to 10. However, the
estimated  does not vanish or lose its signiﬁcance in the presence of these other measures,
suggesting that  may indeed measure the price of equipment to an extent not captured
completely by more conventional measures of capital stock and the real price of investment,
which do not take into account the quality of capital.
Overall, Table 7 suggests that the skill-biased technological change measure, ,h a st h e
negative association with  that is predicted by the model. The results in Table 7 are
encouraging, not only for revealing a connection between skill-biased technological change
and the skill-to-non-skill ratio, but also for providing evidence in support of  as a relevant
measure of skill-biased technological change.
7.2 Unionization and Skill-biased Technological Change
Next, consider the connection between unionization and skill-biased technological change,
the purpose of the analysis. The fraction unionized in the model economy is determined in
general equilibrium by consumers’ consumption/savings decisions, ﬁrms’ input choices, the
union’s decisions about wage setting and organizing, and various market-clearing conditions—
see deﬁnition (2). This relationship cannot be represented by a simple expression as could




. As in (10), assume that unionization in industry  in year
, , as measured either by the percentage of industry employees who are union members
or by the percentage covered by a union, can be approximated in a log-linear form as
ln =  ln + λlnX +  +  +  (11)
The ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation in (11) can be estimated using the balanced panel of 61
industries available from the Union Membership and Coverage Database for the period
 =1 9 8 3 1999. These industries include the 19 manufacturing industries used in the
previous section, plus non-manufacturing industries. The error term is assumed to satisfy
33the same assumptions as in (10). It is also important to assess how the eﬀects of other fac-
tors typically associated with the decline in unionization over time compare with the eﬀects
of skill-biased technological change.19 For the purpose of examining the separate role of
skill-biased technological change among other important factors considered in the literature,
a version of (11) is also implemented with time-varying covariates Z instead of the time
ﬁxed eﬀects.
The sign of  in (11) is expected to be positive: as the relative price of equipment and
software declines—indicating skill-biased technological progress—unionization should decline.
X includes the logarithm of the number of establishments per capita in an industry, in
addition to real output and labor productivity. The motivation for including real output and
labor productivity was discussed earlier. The number of establishments per capita is intended
as a crude measure of the intensity of competition. Although the degree of competition is
not part of the model, which assumes a competitive environment, more intense competition
in general can strip rents from ﬁr m st h a tc a no t h e r w i s eb ec a p t u r e di np a r tb yu n i o n s . 20
The expected sign of that variable’s coeﬃcient is thus negative. The variables included in
Z assess the eﬀects of various nationwide trends on unionization.21 The share of part-time
employment is included because part-time employees are less likely to be union members.
Thus, an increasing reliance on part-time labor can lead to lower unionization. The fraction
of the U.S. population in the south and west controls for the migration of workers and
ﬁrms to generally union-unfriendly, right-to-work law states in these regions.22 Younger
people may also have less friendly attitudes towards unions, as newer generations are less
19 See Hirsch (2008) for a survey of factors that are thought to have played a role in the decline of unions.
20 See, for example, Farber (1987, 1990), who suggests that increased product market competition is one
factor in the decline of unionization.
21 The variables in Z are measured at the nationwide level. Industry counterparts of some of these
variables, such as shares of part-time and young workers in industry employment, are available from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). These measures are based on small samples for many industries. Therefore
they are likely to contain measurement error. Note that the dependent variable  may also be subject to
measurement error in the CPS, but that is less of a concern in estimating the primary coeﬃcient of interest,
. Experimentation with industry-level measures did not change the main results of the estimation.
22 See Reder (1988) and Hirsch (2008) for a discussion.
34exposed to a strong union tradition. Therefore, as the fraction of young people (aged 18
to 45) in the population increases, unionization may decline. Finally, the trade variables,
imports and exports, are both expected to have a negative association with unionization.
Increasing imports or outsourcing adversely aﬀects employment and hence unions, while
escalating exports may signify greater exposure to foreign competition, which may reduce
union rents. Exports may also proxy for the generally more advanced technology and the
higher productivity of exporters, which may rely more heavily on skilled workers as opposed
to unskilled ones.23 Similar to the estimation of (10), one-period lagged counterparts are
also used as instruments for the logarithms of real output, labor productivity, the number
of establishments per capita, and the relative price of E&S.
The estimation results are in Table 8. Speciﬁcations 1 and 2 use only ln and a
constant as the regressors. These bivariate regressions indicate that the variation in ln
accounts for as much as 12 to 14 percent of the variation in ln across industries and
time. Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 control for industry ﬁxed eﬀects, which still indicate a positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for ln Speciﬁcations 5 to 8 include industry ﬁxed eﬀects and
year dummies, but no industry-year varying controls, X The estimated  is still positive
and signiﬁcant at conventional levels.24 Speciﬁcations 9 to 12 include the controls X and
Z, instead of year dummies.25 All of these speciﬁcations also result in a positive and
signiﬁcant estimate for . The estimates of  across speciﬁcations 5 to 12 indicate that a 1%
decline in  is associated with a 004% to 021% decline in  The coeﬃcient estimates
for the controls are generally consistent across speciﬁcations 9 to 12, but only some exhibit
statistical signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcients of imports and exports have the expected negative
signs, and they are both consistently statistically signiﬁcant. Output and labor productivity
23 See Baldwin (2003) for an extensive investigation of the eﬀects of trade on unionization in the U.S.
24 Note that year dummies absorb some of the variation in ln over time, and lead to smaller estimates
for Average  across industries declined steadily over time, implying that year eﬀects, which also indicate
a steady decline in  over time, are highly correlated with average 
25 The number of observations in the speciﬁcations with output is lower because industry codes did not
match perfectly across the output dataset and the relative price dataset.
35were expected to have non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. This is the case in OLS speciﬁcations.
However, output has a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, and labor productivity has a
signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient, in the IV estimations.26 The young population and the
population in south and west have generally negative and sometimes signiﬁcant coeﬃcients,
in line with the priors. The number of establishments per capita and part-time labor’s share
have positive coeﬃcients, contrary to what was expected.
A ﬁrst-diﬀerence regression that removes the industry ﬁxed eﬀects in levels was also run
as a further robustness check. If the variables used in Table 8 exhibit non-stationarity, then
spurious correlations between the dependent variable and the regressors may result. First-
diﬀerencing also helps to address this issue. The stationarity of all the diﬀerenced variables
are investigated using panel unit root tests. Based on ﬁve diﬀerent panel unit root tests
for each variable, there was no strong evidence to conclude against the hypothesis that the
panels for diﬀerenced variables are trend-stationary.27 The one-period lagged diﬀerenced
regressors are used as instruments, as in Table 8. The results, shown in Table A1 in the
Appendix, are consistent with the results in Table 8, and indicate a signiﬁcant positive
association between  and .
To assess the magnitude of the eﬀect on unionization of technological progress, simple
calculations can be made. The decline in the average of  across industries over the entire
1983 to 1999 period was 55%.28 Suppose that an industry experiences this average change
in  in a linear fashion over the years, holding all other variables ﬁxed. Then, the average
decline in union membership/coverage during the 1983 to 1999 period attributable only to
26 The latter ﬁnding suggests that unions may target more productive industries, in accord with the
model’s prediction that unions will organize the most productive ﬁrms ﬁrst. However, this result is not
viewed as a formal test of unions targeting more productive ﬁrms — an undertaking left for future work.
27 The panel unit root tests employed are the Levin-Lin-Chu, Harris-Tzavalis, Breitung, Im-Pesaran-Shin,
Fisher-type tests based on Phillips-Perron, and Hadri LM. All tests allow for a time trend. For the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of  all 5 tests indicate stationarity for membership and coverage at the 1% level. For the ﬁrst
diﬀerence of , 4 out of 5 tests conclude stationarity at the 1% level. For each of the remaining diﬀerenced
variables, at least 3 out of the 5 tests indicate stationarity at the 1% level.
28 The largest average annual percentage decline over the sample period in the relative price of E&S
occurred in Air Transportation (∼ 11%) , followed by Radio and Television (∼ 95%), and Business Services
(∼ 9%). The smallest annual decline was in Farms (∼ 2%).
36the decline in  ranges between 15 and 6 percentage points based on speciﬁcations 5 to 12
in Table 8, and 49 to 107 percentage points based on the ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcations in
Table A1. Over this time period the average of union membership and coverage rates across
industries in the sample declined by about 8 and 10 percentage points, respectively.
8C o n c l u s i o n
A general equilibrium model of unionization is developed here. Firms hire capital, skilled
labor and unskilled workers. They diﬀer in their productivity. A union can organize unskilled
labor, but at a cost. It cares about the wage rate that its members will earn. It also is
concerned about how many workers will receive this wage. There is a trade oﬀ between
these two objectives. The union sets the wage so that it squeezes all of the rents from the
last ﬁrm organized. The higher is the union wage the smaller is the number of unionized
ﬁr m sa n dt h ea m o u n to fu n s k i l l e dl a b o rt h a te a c hw i l lh i r e .
The structure of production inﬂuences the value of unskilled labor in economy. When
the productivity of unskilled labor is (relatively) high it pays for the union to organize a lot
of ﬁrms and demand generous wages. The shift from an artisan economy to an assembly
line economy during the beginning of the 20th century was associated with an increase in
the (relative) productivity of unskilled labor that led to an increase in unionization and a
decrease in income inequality. The decline of the assembly line economy and the rise of the
information age during the second half of the century reversed this. This led to the ∩-shaped
pattern of unionization and the ∪-shaped one for income inequality.
The empirical analysis proceeds on three fronts. First, qualitative evidence is presented
from a historical perspective. This evidence discussed the evolution of unionization and
the shifts in the mix of skilled and unskilled labor used in production in the wake of some
fundamental changes in the U.S. economy that occurred during the 20th century. These
changes were brought about by the introduction of mass production techniques in the ﬁrst
half of century and by computerization in the second half. Second, the constructed model is
calibrated and simulated to gauge whether or not it could explain the above stylized facts. It
37can. To obtain the desired result the skill bias in technology must follow a ∩-shaped pattern.
T h er e q u i r e ds h i f ti nt e c h n o l o g yi sn o tt h a tl a r g e . I ta l s om i r r o r st h eq u a l i t a t i v ep a t t e r n
expected from economic history. Third, some statistical analysis is undertaken in a panel-
data regression framework that relates unionization to skill-biased technological change.
Following the macroeconomics literature, the relative price of new equipment and soft-
ware is taken as a measure of skill-biased technological change. The idea is that technological
progress is embodied in the form of new capital goods. Technological progress in the capital
g o o d ss e c t o ri sr e ﬂected by a declining relative price for investment. Industries where the
price of the capital inputs drop the quickest should experience the fastest pace for skill-biased
technological change. This idea was tested in two ways. First, the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor rose the most in those industries where the relative price of capital fell the greatest.
The eﬀect was statistically signiﬁcant, even after controlling for shifts in the skill premium,
inter alia. Second, the data supports the hypothesis that the decline in this relative price




Figure 1. The data is taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial
Edition. Union membership is taken from three series: Series Ba4789 for 1890 to 1914;
Series Ba4783 for 1915 to 1976; Series Ba4788 is for 1977 to 1999. The union membership
series is then divided through by a measure of the labor force. For this, the total civilian
labor force is taken from Series Ba471. The farm labor force is netted out of this series.
For 1890 to 1990, Series Ba472 is used for the farm labor force. Series Ba482 gives the
data for 1991 to 1999. The data on the income distribution is series Be29. It refers to the
distribution of income among taxpaying units, speciﬁcally the share of income received by
the 10th percentile. Income is net of corporate taxes and employer-paid payroll taxes, but is
before individual income taxes and individual-paid payroll taxes; it excludes capital gains.
The series is based on work by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez.
Figure 2. The underlying data series come from Historical Statistics of the United States:
Millennial Edition. The unskilled labor force is taken to be the sum of clerical workers (Series
Ba1038), sales workers (Ba1039), operatives (Ba1041) and laborers (Ba1045). The skilled
workforce is professionals (Ba1034) plus managers and oﬃcials (Ba1037) added together
with craft workers (Ba1040). In the ﬁgure the ratio of these two series is plotted.
Sections 2.2 and 7. The main data source for facts about unionization is the Union
Membership and Coverage Database (available at www.unionstats.com). This dataset con-
tains two main variables that measure unionization: the union membership rate and the
union coverage rate. These rates were constructed by occupation and industry using the
u n i o nm e m b e r s h i pq u e s t i o n sa s k e dt oi n d i v i d u a l ss a m p l e di nt h eCurrent Population Survey
(CPS). Their responses were aggregated by using the appropriate sample weights in the sur-
vey designed to estimate unionization at the industry and occupation levels. In the data a
union member is deﬁned to be a wage or salaried worker who answered that s/he belonged
to a union. Persons covered by a union are deﬁned to be union members and non-members
39who reported being covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Total employment in an
industry or occupation is also available from the same data source. In the analysis here,
the public sector is excluded from industries, but occupations include workers in the public
s e c t o r .T h ef o c u so nt h e1 9 8 3 - 2 0 0 2p e r i o di nt h ea n a l y s i si sp r i m a r i l yd u et ot h ef a c tt h a t
the detailed industry and occupation codes in the CPS before 1983 and after 2002 cannot
be made consistent with those during this period.
T h er e a lo u t p u td a t au s e di nT a b l e5c o m e sf r o mt h eU . S .C e n s u sB u r e a u ’ sEconomic
Census, for 1982 and 2002, aggregated to the industry level from the establishment-level
value of shipments deﬂated using the CPI. In Table 7, all variables other than  are
from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database available at www.nber.org/nberces/.
In Table 8, the annual real output data at the industry level is taken from the BEA:
www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm. The percentage of the U.S. population in the
south and west, part-time employment’s share in total employment, the shares of imports
and exports in U.S. GDP, and young people’s share of the U.S. population all come from the
U.S. Census Bureau. The annual number of establishments in an industry is obtained from
County Business Patterns, versions 1983 to 1999, maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau:
www.census.gov/econ/cbp/index.html.
9.2 Theory
Proof. Lemma 1. Suppose not and that an interior solution for unionization occurs. Then,














































































 ()]() to obtain





























 ()]() =0 














−  =0 
This cannot transpire, hence a contradiction.
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44Table 1: Workers in Detroit Metal Industries, 1891
Occupation No. Percent Mean Weekly Income
Foreman 9 2 $19.67
Mechanics 153 39 12.58
Specialists 117 30 8.18
Unskilled Labor 113 29 6.60
Total 392 100 9.55
Source: Meyer (1981, pg. 46)
Table 2: Workers in Ford Motor Company, 1913
Occupation No. Percent
Mechanics and Subforeman 329 2
Skilled Operators 3,431 26
Operators 6,749 51
Unskilled Workers 2,795 21
Total 13,304 100
Source: Meyer (1981, pg. 50)Rank in
employment 
decline Occupation
% Growth in employment 
(1983-2002)
% Union members 
in 1983
1 Brickmason and stonemason apprentices  -97.3 45.1
2 Shoe machine operators -89.9 30.3
3 Railroad brake, signal, and switch operators  -88.8 94.8
4 Housekeepers and butlers  -87.6 1.4
5 Drilling and boring machine operators  -81.4 48.3
6 Helpers, mechanics, and repairers  -80.7 15.4
7 Patternmakers, lay-out workers, and cutters  -78.2 28.8
8 Lathe and turning machine operators  -73.4 36.4
9 Typesetters and compositors  -72.8 14.5
10 Shoe repairers  -72.2 9.5
11 Solderers and brazers -69.5 23.9
12 Rail vehicle operators, n.e.c.  -68.2 90.9
13 Milling and planing machine operators  -68.0 40.4
14 Adjusters and calibrators  -67.6 46.9
15 Lathe and turning machine set-up operators  -66.4 58.8
16 Roasting and baking machine operators, food  -65.6 72.5
17 Sociologists -65.2 79.0
18 Production samplers and weighers  -64.4 28.6
19 Winding and twisting machine operators  -64.3 11.3




% Growth in employment 
(1983-2002)
% Union members 
in 1983
1 Numerical control machine operators 1747.0 36.9
2 Helpers, construction trades 1010.2 10.8
3 Managers, medicine and health 796.8 8.7
4 Health diagnosing practitioners, n.e.c.  718.7 32.2
5 Marine engineers 565.0 100.0
6 Computer systems analysts and scientists 519.3 7.4
7 Graders and sorters, agricultural products    471.5 16.6
8 Physical scientists, n.e.c. 419.0 0.5
9 Medical scientists 362.5 6.2
10 Management analysts 338.9 3.4
11 Teachers, special education 328.0 55.0
12 Postsecondary teachers, subject not specified  307.9 13.4
13 Precision assemblers, metal  306.4 69.7
14 Authors 303.5 13.9
15 Health technologists and technicians, n.e.c.  278.6 10.9
16 Social scientists, n.e.c.  273.7 16.1
17 Investigators and adjusters, except insurance   256.8 10.9
18 Physical therapists 249.5 14.7
19 Demonstrators, promoters and models, sales     219.9 14.2
20 Dentists 211.1 3.4
Notes: Gray shading indicates a unionization rate in the top quartile of the 1983 unionization rates across occupations
Fastest declining occupations
TABLE 3. Fastest declining versus fastest growing occupations (1983-2002)
Fastest growing occupations1 2 3 412341234
% union members in 1983 -1.054*** - -0.201 - -0.927*** - -0.370*** - -0.852*** - -0.387*** -
[0.379] [0.317] [0.176] [0.142] [0.215] [0.128]
% covered by unions in 1983 - -0.458 - 0.202 - -0.866*** - -0.391*** - -0.719*** - -0.483***
[0.557] [0.524] [0.172] [0.131] [0.209] [0.093]
% growth in union members 0.809*** - 0.512*** - 0.521*** -
[0.129] [0.051] [0.030]
% growth in union coverage - 0.911*** - 0.568*** - 0.637***
[0.148] [0.059] [0.024]
N 474 474 474 474 465 465 465 465 474 474 474 474
R
2 or Pseudo R
2
0.06 0.05 0.16 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.33 0.36 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.22
employment are excluded. Trimmed sample OLS excludes cases with employment growth exceeding 500%.
TABLE 4. Employment growth rate versus unionization - Occupations
Dependent variable: 
% growth in employment in occupation between 1983 and 2002 
OLS OLS (Trimmed Sample) Quantile Regression (Median)
Notes: All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in brackets. (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 5 cases with missing 1983 or 2002 
Independent variables:12341234123 4
% union members in 1983 -2.265*** - -1.527*** - -0.967*** - -1.257*** - -1.281*** - -1.361*** -
[0.672] [0.451] [0.205] [0.253] [0.234] [0.328]
% covered by unions in 1983 - -2.037*** - -1.373*** -0.898*** - -1.218*** - -1.251*** - -1.448***
[0.625] [0.430] [0.195] [0.235] [0.211] [0.230]
% growth in union members 0.428*** - 0.203 - 0.215** - 0.281*** - 0.498*** - 0.311*** -
[0.055] [0.148] [0.089] [0.073] [0.011] [0.078]
% growth in union coverage - 0.399*** - 0.120 - 0.165*** - 0.167*** - 0.497*** - 0.303***
[0.083] [0.081] [0.057] [0.063] [0.012] [0.051]
% growth in real output 0.060 0.061 0.009** 0.009** 0.011*** 0.010***
[0.038] [0.039] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
% growth in real output per worker 0.048 0.035 0.023 0.005 0.022 0.006
[0.171] [0.171] [0.063] [0.063] [0.069] [0.051]
N 218 219 165 166 208 209 159 160 218 219 165 166
R
2 or Pseudo R
2 0.16 0.15 0.30 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.15
TABLE 5. Employment growth rate versus unionization - Industries
Dependent variable: 
% growth in industry employment between 1983 and 2002 
OLS OLS (Trimmed Sample) Quantile Regression (Median)
Notes: All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in brackets. (*), (**), (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Cases where growth rates cannot be calculated to 
due a zero denominator are excluded. Trimmed sample OLS excludes cases with employment growth exceeding 500%. 
Independent variables:Table 6: Parameter Values
Parameter Deﬁnition Basis
Tastes
 =( 1 04)−5 discount factor standard
Technology
 =0 60 labor’s share Greenwood et al. (2010)
 =1− (1 − 008)5 depreciation rate standard
 =0 20 exponent on capital Guner et al. (2008, p 732)
 =0 29 elasticity of substitution Katz and Murphy (1992, eq 19)
1955 =0 45 weight on skilled labor data target
1955 =1 0 shift factor on skilled labor normalization
 =3 5 Pareto distribution data target
 =0 1 ﬁxed cost data target
Unionization
 =0 65 ideals—wage data target
 =1 1 organization costs, exponent data target
 =0 03 organization costs, constant data targetSpecification: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
industry relative price of equipment and software -0.203*** -0.256*** -0.403*** -0.411*** -0.369*** -0.395*** -0.159** -0.191*** -0.205* -0.242***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.09] [0.03] [0.07] [0.04] [0.07] [0.04] [0.10] [0.04]
industry relative wage of production workers - - 1.660*** 1.860*** 1.669*** 1.935*** 1.383*** 1.575*** 1.623*** 1.873***
[0.37] [0.09] [0.39] [0.10] [0.25] [0.10] [0.37] [0.10]
real industry output - - - - 0.004 0.034 -0.248** -0.210*** -0.035 -0.007
[0.08] [0.02] [0.11] [0.03] [0.09] [0.02]
real industry output per worker - - - - 0.090 0.055 0.208* 0.183*** 0.092 0.067*
[0.08] [0.04] [0.10] [0.03] [0.09] [0.03]
real industry capital stock - - - - - - 0.315*** 0.281*** - -
[0.09] [0.02]
real industry price of investment - - - - - - - - -0.659 -0.590***
[0.41] [0.08]
Industry fixed effects NYYYYYYYYY
Year fixed effects NNYYYYYYYY
N 798 798 798 779 798 779 798 779 798 779
R-sq 0.04 0.47 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.78
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by industry) in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. The number of observations in the IV 
estimations is lower due to the lagged instruments.
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of skill ratio, S it
TABLE 7. Regression analysis of the relationship between the skill ratio and the relative price of equipment and software
Independent variables:
(in logs except for fixed effects)
OLS 2SLS IV OLS 2SLS IV OLS 2SLS IV OLS 2SLS IV OLS OLSSpecification: 1234 5 6 7 8 91 01 11 2
mem. cov. mem. cov. mem. mem. cov. cov. mem. mem. cov. cov.
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS IV OLS 2SLS IV OLS 2SLS IV OLS 2SLS IV
industry relative price of 
equipment and software
0.557*** 0.484*** 0.461*** 0.485*** 0.044** 0.080*** 0.036* 0.129*** 0.036* 0.141** 0.108** 0.210***
[0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.06] [0.05] [0.08]
real industry output ---- - - - - -0.066 -0.272*** -0.012 -0.250***
[0.13] [0.10] [0.11] [0.09]
real industry output per worker ---- - - - - 0.003 0.421*** -0.005 0.433***
[0.14] [0.13] [0.14] [0.12]
number of industry 
establishments per capita
---- - - - - -0.013 0.190** -0.002 0.210***
[0.11] [0.09] [0.11] [0.08]
% U.S. employment classified 
as part time
---- - - - - 0.615** 0.275 0.603** 0.223
[0.23] [0.29] [0.23] [0.26]
% U.S. population in south and 
west
---- - - - - -1.178* -0.396 -1.671*** -1.082*
[0.62] [0.72] [0.54] [0.64]
% share of imports in U.S. GDP ---- - - - - -0.565*** -0.405** -0.607*** -0.418***
[0.20] [0.17] [0.21] [0.15]
% share of exports in U.S. GDP ---- - - - - -0.365*** -0.441*** -0.353*** -0.422***
[0.11] [0.10] [0.11] [0.09]
% U.S. population classified as 
young 
---- - - - - -1.160 0.883 -1.806* -0.210
[0.83] [1.26] [0.90] [1.13]
Industry fixed effects NNYY Y Y Y Y YYYY
Year fixed effects NNNN Y Y Y Y NNNN
N 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 976 1037 976 748 704 748 704
R-sq 0.14 0.12 0.32 0.41 0.37 0.46 0.35 0.44
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by industry) in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. The number of observations in the IV
estimations is lower due to the lagged instruments. The number of observations in specifications 9 to 12 is lower because not all industries had matching output data.
TABLE 8. Regression analysis of the relationship between unionization and the relative price of equipment and software
Independent variables:
(in logs except year dummies)
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of percent union membership (mem. ) or coverage (cov.)Specification: 1 2 3 4
mem. mem. cov. cov.
OLS 2SLS IV OLS 2SLS IV
industry relative price of 
equipment and software
0.435*** 0.248* 0.537*** 0.418**
[0.08] [0.11] [0.10] [0.19]
real industry output 0.045 -0.013 0.056 0.010
[0.04] [0.17] [0.03] [0.18]
real industry output per worker -3.263 -7.054*** -9.965*** -8.536***
[1.95] [1.59] [1.26] [1.01]
log number of industry 
establishments per capita
-0.038* 0.076 -0.042* 0.038
[0.02] [0.25] [0.02] [0.25]
% U.S. employment classified 
as part time
0.176 -0.097 0.356 0.086
[0.15] [0.32] [0.23] [0.27]
% U.S. population in south and 
west
0.200 -0.057 0.300 0.137
[0.22] [0.42] [0.25] [0.38]
% share of imports in U.S. GDP -0.402 0.159 -0.357 0.163
[0.29] [0.77] [0.34] [0.76]
% share of exports in U.S. GDP -0.263 -0.213 -0.284 -0.228
[0.17] [0.21] [0.20] [0.19]
% U.S. population classified as 
young 
-0.573* -0.851* -0.695** -1.088*
[0.29] [0.50] [0.33] [0.63]
N 704 660 704 660
R-sq 0.06 0.08
Notes: Standard errors (clustered by industry) in brackets. (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1%, respectively. The number of observations in the IV




TABLE A1. Regression analysis of the relationship between unionization and the relative price of equipment and software 
(First-Difference Specification)
Dependent variable:  First-difference of percent union membership (mem. ) or coverage (cov.)